A "Kripke-style" semantics is given for combinatory logic using frames with a ternary accessibility relation, much as in the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevance logic. We prove by algebraic means a completeness theorem for combinatory logic, by proving a representation theorem for "combinatory posets." A philosophical interpretation is given of the models, showing that an element of a combinatory poset can be understood simultaneously as a set of states and as a set of (untyped) actions on states. This double interpretation allows for one such element to be applied to another (including itself). Application turns out to be modeled the same way as "fusion" in relevance logic.
Introduction
In this paper we arrange a marriage between combinatory logic and substructural logics, showing how they can mutually support each other. Indeed, substructural logics, at least in their implication/fusion fragments, can be viewed as combinatory logics (with residuation) where the combinators are limited so as to license only certain "structural" rules. And somewhat surprisingly, combinatory logic can itself be viewed as a substructural logic, and a semantics can be provided for it using a ternary accessibility relation as has been done with other substructural logics.
2 This way of looking at things organizes combinatory logics under the general framework of "gaggle theory" as found in Dunn (1991) and particularly Dunn (1993a) . Routley and Meyer (1973) provide a "Kripke-style" semantics for relevance logic 1 Full version of an invited paper presented at the 3rd Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation (WoLLIC'96 ), May 8-10, Salvador (Bahia), Brazil, organised by UFPE and UFBA, sponsored by IGPL, FoLLI, and ASL. 2 The basic idea of playing variations on the ternary accessibility relation so as to obtain various logics can be found in . Cf. also Došen (1988 Došen ( , 1992 , Ono (1993) , and Dunn (1993a).
using a ternary accessibility relation R. 3 The truth condition for relevant implication is as follows:
χ |= ϕ → ψ iff (∀α, β : Rχαβ & α ϕ imply β ψ).
(1.1)
More immediately useful for our purposes will be the truth condition for "fusion" (intensional conjunction):
It is natural to think of a set of a states as a "proposition" (the set of states in which it is true). We talk in terms of "states," rather than the more customary "possible worlds," because we have computers very much in mind. A proposition describing a computer can be thought of as delimiting the set of states that it can have. It is important to stress that our idea of a state allows that there can be partial states (and possibly even inconsistent states, though there seems to be no immediate need to bring these to the fore). It is best then to think of these states as states of information concerning a given computer. Letting ϕ represent the set of states that make ϕ true, we can rephrase the truth conditions above as:
In the early 1970's, P. Woodruff 4 suggested thinking of the ternary relation R as an indexed set of binary relations {R ρ } ρ∈U , where each R ρ = { α, β : Rραβ}. It is a short metaphorical step from this to the observation in Dunn (1995) that one can think of each state ρ as having a dual nature, first as a state and second as determining a binary relation R ρ αβ between states α and β. This can be given the "philosophical" reading: "the pair α, β exemplifies the relation (determined by ) ρ." Or it can be given the more "technological" reading: if the machine is currently in state ρ, then if it were to enter state α, then state β is a potential outcome (the pair α, β is a possible transition given ρ).
The reader may wonder why we need this ternary relation of accessibility, and not just a binary one, which is more usual. 5 It might be argued that if α is a state, then all the information that is relevant to possible transitions is contained in α alone, and so there is no reason to consider the "perspective" of ρ. Indeed, on a deterministic conception of computation, the initial state would uniquely determine all of the subsequent states. But this objection overlooks the fact that we are working with partial states. 6 The information in α may well be partial and the information 7 This means that a set of states can be simultaneously regarded as a set of relations on states, i.e., as a set of possible actions. As we said, a proposition describing a computer can be interpreted as a set of states. But depending on which state the computer is in, it is ready to execute any number of possible actions. A possible action can be viewed as a state transition, and this can be viewed abstractly as just a binary relation between states. 8 The problem in interpreting the (untyped) λ-calculus of Church (1941) , or the combinatorylogic of Curry and Feys (1972) , has always been how to interpret an expression such as M M , which treats M as simultaneously standing for both a function and an argument. In the early seventies, Scott gave two different models of the λ-calculus (the limit model D ∞ and the graph model P ω). The last of these (cf. Scott (1976) ) is most relevant to our present concerns, and uses the well-known correspondence of Cantor between a natural number and a pair of natural numbers. Thus a set X of natural numbers can be simultaneously be regarded as a relation between natural numbers, and so we can make sense of X(Y ) as the X-image of Y. Meyer, Bunder, and Powers (1991) has a similar model of combinatorylogic, constructed by taking a set U, and closing it under pairing so as to obtain the set U * = U ∪ U 2 ∪ U 3 · · · . Then for X, Y ⊆ U * , X(Y ) = {χ : ∃γ ∈ Y ( χ, γ ∈ X)}. 9 Barendregt, Coppo, and Dezani-Ciancaglini (1983) independently hit upon a similar (but smoother) idea called the "filter model."
The discussion above of the ternary relation showed how to achieve the effect of a similar type-defying interpretation: a proposition B can be simultaneously thought of as both a set of states and a set of relations between states (note well that we are up a type-level from Scott, Meyer et al, and Barendregt et al ). Where ρ is a relation, and B is a set, the ρ-image of B = {χ : ∃β ∈ B (ρβχ)}. Going up a typelevel, where A is a set of relations, it is natural to define a corresponding image AB = {χ : ∃ρ ∈ A, ∃β ∈ B (ρβχ)}, and to think of this as a kind of application. Now regarding ρ as simultaneously a relation and a state, we stick in the ternary relation R of "exemplification," rewriting this as:
α and β being states in another processor (or complexes of processors including maybe the whole system) whose operation is affected by ρ. This kind of approach leads to the idea that states are of different types, and we are here wanting a type-free system. But we think it is worth exploring typed systems as well, particularly the division between operations and data. 7 One way to look at things is that we are somehow combining ρ and α and seeing whether this combination is contained in β: ρ + α ⊑ β. The simplest mode of combination would just be in effect to take their "union" ρ ∨ α. Thus thinking of a state as an assignment of the binary bits 0 or 1 to variables, a variable x i will be assigned one of these values by ρ ∨ α if either ρ or α assigns it that value. This is the minimal requirement on a "union." But oops! What happens if say ρ assigns x i the value 1 and α assigns it 0? One could imagine various answers here as to what value ρ + α assigns. E.g., it could assign no value, it could assign an error message, it could assign some principled choice (say, when in doubt take the maximum), or, most radically but perhaps most naturally for the concept of a "union," we give up on the idea that assignments are consistent and let it assign both values. But if we require that the assignments ρ, α, and β must be consistent, one of the most interesting things to do is to take the maximum. This ensures to Rραβ iff ρ ⊑ β and α ⊑ β, which as can be seen from Dunn (1993c) gives a ternary accessibility relation which provides the basis for a semantics for intuitionistic implication.
8 This idea can be used (cf. Dunn (1993b) ) to give a representation of relation algebras, where the elements are represented as sets of relations. There is also a possibility to use it to give a semantics for a Hoare-like logic (cf. Hoare (1969) ), where ϕ[ϑ]ψ is to be interpreted as ∀χ ∈ ϑ : χ ∈ ϕ → ψ , i.e., ϑ (thought of as a program) transforms ϕ states into ψ states. But this interpretation not yet been investigated in any detail.
Returning to the computer metaphor, A • B is the set of states that can be reached from states in B by applying one of the actions in A. Note it is entirely contextdependent, which of A and B is to be thought of as the program, and which is to be thought of as the input. It is clear that the application of one proposition to another is just our old friend fusion. We can now naturally interpret self-application: AA = A • A.
Of course having made some sense of application, we must still make sense of lambda abstraction. Rather than discuss the care and feeding of the λ-operator directly, we shall assume the translation of Curry of λ-calculus into combinatory logic using the combinators K and S, and vice versa. We focus then on combinatorylogic.
The algebras
Most central to our purposes is the notion of a combinatory poset, which will be built on top of the notion of a left residuated poset with lower left identity. But we introduce a number of algebraic structures that will also be useful for various purposes.
Definition 2.1 A partially-order ed groupoid is a structure (X, ≤, •), where (X, ≤) is poset, and • is a binary operation on L such that:
A p. o. semi-group additionally satisfies:
Definition 2.2 A left lower identity element e is an element satisfying
it is called a (full) left identity. A right lower identity element e ′ is an element satisfying
A (full) right identity is an element satisfying
A (full) identity is an element satisfying both (2.4) and (2.6).
Remark 2.3
It is easy to see that if there is both a full left identity e and a full right identity e ′ , then they are in fact identical since e = e • e ′ = e ′ .
Definition 2.4
A left residual is characterized as follows:
A right residual satisfies:
Definition 2.5 A left (right) residuated groupoid is a partially-ordered groupoid with a left (right) residual. A (doubly) residuated groupoid has both left and right residuals.
Remark 2.6 Residuals were introduced in Ward and Dilworth (1939). They are easily proven unique. If • is commutative, then x → y = y ← x. Note well that we have reversed the direction of the arrows from that often used in the literature (including some previous papers of Dunn). The reason is to preserve the usual sense of the "Curry-Howard Isomorphism," which connects combinators with theorems of implicational logics (see below). Of course we could always write "A implies B" as B ← A and avoid this reversal. Indeed, given the notational direction of Prolog this would be consistent with a computer science tradition. But we cater here to logical tradition.
Residuated groupoids arise naturally in the structure of substructural logics, since residuation corresponds naturally to the Deduction Theorem and its converse, with the residual x → y read as an implication. When Gentzen sequents are understood in the usual way as formed by anadic constructions rather than pairing, associativity is a natural property. The left identity element e is a way of indicating "theorems," with e ≤ a read as "a is a theorem." Cf. Dunn (1993a) and other papers in Schröder-Heister and Dǒsen (1993). Partially-ordered groupoids with both left and right residuals correspond to that version of the (non-associative) Lambek calculus which does not permit empty left-hand sides. Adding an identity element corresponds to allowing an empty antecedent. Note that if we have say only a left residual then we only need to have a left identity element. Left residuated groupoids with a left identity were studied in under the heading "Ackermann groupoids." They pointed out that Ackermann groupoids, supplemented with an underlying distributive lattice, algebraize the minimal positive relevance logic B + . also recognized the usefulness both of having a right residual in addition to a left one, and adding constants for the combinators.
We choose to algebraize the combinators as a combinatory poset, i.e., as a partiallyordered groupoid (X, ≤, •, C), where X is thought of as a set of untyped functions, ≤ is a partial order on X (thought of as "reducibility"), • is a binary isotonic operator on X (thought of as "application"), and C ⊆ X.
10 C is thought of as a set of combinators, and we shall call its members combinator elements). Each combinator element c ∈ C is subject to some postulate of the form As examples consider:
It is often customary to require identities in the above laws, rather than just the inequality, e.g., requiring kxy = x. This corresponds to requiring reducibility in both directions, so when this is done we shall refer to a two-way combinatory poset.
The notion of a combinatory poset, particularly a two-way one, is similar to the notion of a "combinatorial algebra" in Barendregt (1981) , except that he bases things throughout on equality rather than the inequality, and his combinators are required to be S, K. The idea of combinatory logic is that one postulates certain reducibility relations, e.g., Kxy B x, Sxyz B xz(yz) and one assumes that B is reflexive and transitive and satisfies replacement. From an algebraic point of view one does not want to distinguish items that reduce to each other. One then has two choices: one can identify two items σ and σ ′ when σ B σ ′ , or one can instead require two-way reducibility: σ CB σ ′ . We have chosen the second option. We adopt the following notational conventions. We use upper-case boldface Roman characters (e.g., K, S, I, C, B, W) to denote both intuitive combinators and combinators as we shall represent them on a frame. We use the script letter C as a variable over such combinators. We use the corresponding lower-case character (e.g., k, s, i, c, b, w) to denote combinator elements in a combinatory poset. We use lower-case italic, e.g., x, y, z, as general variables over a combinatory poset, reserving c as a variable ranging over the combinator elements. Although these next conventions will not be clear until later, we use upper-case italic letters, e.g., A, B, as variables over hereditary subsets of a frame, and we use lower-case Roman letters as variables ranging over the points in a combinator on a frame (e.g., k, s, i, c, b, w). Of course we may subscript these or otherwise decorate them.
Two special kinds of combinatory posets have both historical and conceptual interest. We call (X, ≤, •, {k, s}) a λ-poset , and by a λI-poset we mean a combinatory 11 Because of the form of these laws, the combinator elements correspond to what have been called "proper" combinators (cf. Curry and Feys (1972) , and which may be viewed as closed lambda terms. We do not bother with the more accurate but more awkward terminology "proper combinator poset." poset (X, ≤, •, {s, i, c, b}). The designations are based on Curry's translations of the λ-calculus and the λI-calculus using the corresponding combinators.
In what follows we shall also want to consider combinatory posets supplemented with a left residual (and occasionally a right residual as well). We shall speak, respectively, of left residuated (and residuated) combinatory posets.
Ternary frames
We next define the structures out of which the representations will be constructed. Definition 3.1 By an applicative frame (for short, frame),we shall mean a triple (U, ⊑, R), where (U, ⊑) is a non-empty poset, and R is a ternary relation on U , subject to the following "tonicity" conditions:
Applicative frames are the same as what were called "articulated frames" in Dunn (1993) . Let us assess these postulates in terms of our computer metaphor. Thus consider (3.1) rephrased so as to emphasize our dual interpretation of α as a binary relation:
It is easy to be momentarily confused by the reversal of direction from left to right. But a moment's reflection shows this makes perfect sense. In general a "smaller" relation (fewer ordered pairs) is actually a "stronger" relation, and consequently contains more information. Thus given two relations R and S, we define
This "reversal" is no less true when applied to computers. R α is an accessibility relation between states, saying which γ are possible given a state β. The fewer pairs (β, γ) that are in the relation, the more information we have. Thus when (3.5) is rewritten, using the information order ⊑ in place of the subset relation ⊆, we get a postulate that clearly preserves the information order:
The requirement (3.2) seems more or less self-evident. It says that if β ′ is a substate of β and α allows the transition from β to γ, then α also allows the transition from β ′ to γ. Just extend β ′ to β. We thus in effect view β ′ ⊑ β as an "absolute" accessibility relation, which "transitizes" with a parameterized accessibility relation R α βγ.
The requirement (3.3) appears equally self-evident and again amounts to a kind of transitivity. It says that if α allows the transition from β to γ and γ is a substate of γ ′ , then α also allows the transition from β to γ ′ . Again just extend γ to γ ′ . We have to talk about one more requirement: heredity. We will not interpret every set of states A as a meaningful set. We require that A be a cone, i.e., if α ∈ A and α ⊑ χ then χ ∈ A. Thus we think of A as a "proposition" (the set of states in which it is true), and we require upward closure since a stronger state of information would still make it true. Note that this closure makes just as much sense if we consider A in its dual nature as a set of actions. By virtue of (3.7), R α ⊑ R χ .
Every frame gives rise to a concr ete residuated groupoid. Thus let P(U ) ↑ be the set of cones of U . For A, B ∈ P(U ) ↑ , we define operations ⊙, ⇒ using (1.2) and (1.1). We also define
(3.8)
,, the full concrete residuated groupoid on the frame (U, ⊑, R). Any collection of members of P(U )
↑ that is closed under these operations will be called a concrete partially-ordered residuated groupoid.
It is easy to verify that this gives a residuated groupoid (with ⊆ as the lattice order), and so we have the following. Proposition 3.3 A "concrete residuated groupoid" really is a residuated groupoid.
Remark 3.4
The role of (3.3), (3.1), and (3.2) is to assure, respectively, that ⊙, ⇒, and ⇐ carry hereditary subsets to hereditary subsets. If one is considering just one of ⇒ and ⇐, then one needs only the appropriate one of the tonicity conditions.
In order to get a concr ete residuated monoid we need both associativity and a two-sided identity, and we must impose more conditions on an frame.
In order to get a left identity element, we need a set Z ⊆ U so
As will be shown, we can achieve this by requiring that the frame be ordered in its 1st position by Z, i.e., ∃i ∈ Z(Riαβ) iff α ⊑ β.
(3.10)
Definition 3.5 A left assertional frame is a structure (U, ⊑, R, Z), where Z ⊆ U satisfies (3.10).
With respect to a subset Z, a frame will be called 1st position weakly reflexive if
Lemma 3.6 A frame ordered in its 1st position by Z is 1st position weakly reflexive.
Proof. Substitute α for β in (3.10).
Proposition 3.7 A concr ete residuated groupoid defined on a left assertional frame has a left identity element.
Proof. We first show (3.9). Suppose that χ ∈ Z ⊙ A, i.e., ∃i ∈ Z, α ∈ A, Riαχ. We know from ordering in the first position that α ⊑ χ. But since A is hereditary, then χ ∈ A. For the other direction, let us suppose that χ ∈ A. For x ∈ Z ⊙ A,we need that ∃i ∈ Z, ∃α ∈ A, Riαχ. But by 1st-position weak reflexivity (3.11), we have ∃i ∈ Z, Riχχ.
Remark 3.8 In order to have a right identity element
we need to require that the frame is ordered in its 2nd position by Z ′ :
As already noted, if we have both a left and a right identity element, then they are in fact the same. This does not follow for left and right lower identities. To get left and right lower identities on a frame we only need postulate the direction from leftto-right of (3.10) and (3.13) (calling these half-ordering in the 1st (2nd) position). A lower left identity is more appropriate for the combinator I given our interpretation of ≤ as one way reducibility. Before going on it is good to introduce some notational conventions:
One of various postulates considered by Routley-Meyer (and needed for the system R of relevant implication) is that these two compositions are equivalent:
It is shown in Dunn (1993) that this can be interpreted as showing that R carries the composition of relations to the composition of their correlates, but we do not assume associativity for the present application, because of course application is not associative.
We assume association to the left so that Rαβγδ abbreviates R(αβ)γδ. We extend this to relations beyond the ternary, defining Rα 1 α 2 . . . α n iff ∃χ(Rα 1 α 2 χ & Rχ . . . α n−1 α n ). We thus in effect regard R as an anadic relation. In general by
We now discuss how to realize the combinators on a frame. The reader will have noticed that we have already shown how to do this for the combinator I, for it is nothing other than a left lower identity element:
The accommodation of other combinators is similar. In each case the combinator stands for a special set of states, and we subject it to a "brute force postulate" requiring that it interacts with the ternary accessibility relation R in a way that assures the truth of the reducibility postulate characterizing the combinator in question. Thus for K, with its characteristic reducibility postulate
we need the frame postulate:
Again this can be replaced with the nicer:
And for the combinator S, with its postulate
we need:
Remark 3.9 If one wants to work with postulates that are identities rather than inequalities, e.g.,
then one simply requires that the corresponding frame postulate be a biconditional rather that simply a conditional, e.g.,
In order to show (3.23) we need to argue (right-to-left) that if α ∈ A then ∃k ∈ K, α ′ ∈ A, β ∈ B, R(kα ′ )βα. Since α ⊑ α we can simply choose α ′ to be α and we can choose any β ∈ B. But this last is the rub. We need to know that B is non-empty. So we have to further restrict our "propositions" to P(U ) ↑ − {∅}. This works fine as long as we are working only with an underlying partial-order, but if we extend this to a semi-lattice then we have to know that the intersection of two non-empty sets is itself non-empty. Of course this is not always the case, so we also need then to require that the partial-order have a top element ⊤.
Diagramming ternary relations
We here systematize a way of diagramming ternary frames. Since at least the mid 1970's, relevance logicians when talking to each other using a chalkboard have visualized Rαβγ as follows:
Of course this notation is not unambiguous. If one were careless, one would diagram Rαβγ and Rβχγ as follows:
And then illegitimately read off Rαχγ:
The trick, which we will not employ here, is to use "oriented" triangles (last arrow points to the final term).
Even here one must be careful to "paint" the surfaces (not having a good drawing program we simply mark them with △), or else one could read the "hole" in the diagram below as an oriented triangle, and mistakenly conclude Rβγµ:
Despite the potential for ambiguity we shall here use the simpler diagrams without arrows. Thus the following diagram pictures R(αβ)γχ ⇒ Rα(βγ)χ, i.e., ∃δ(Rαβδ & Rδγχ) ⇒ ∃δ(Rαδχ & Rβγδ) (placing unlabeled nodes • where there is an implicit existential quantifier):
This property corresponds to associativity of
Adding combinators does not change things much. It just adds another "terminus," "kicking the α out of the way":
This corresponds to BABC ⊆ A(BC) Let us illustrate with another combinator, W. To say that • "duplicates," i.e., AB ⊆ ABB we need the postulate:
Again the left-most terminus is kicked out of the way by the combinator state w:
This corresponds to WAB ⊆ ABB.
For the combinator CABC ⊆ ACB, we need this postulate:
As an exercise, the reader is invited to diagram: SABC ⊆ AC(BC) (which overfilled this page when we tried it).
Representation results
It turns out that not only can one produce concrete residuated groupoids with a left identity given a frame, but up to isomorphism every residuated groupoid can be identified with some such concrete residuated groupoid. This continues to hold true for frames appropriately outfitted so as to accommodate the various kinds of identity elements (right, left, lower, in various combinations).
Theorem 5.1 Every partially-ordered residuated groupoid is isomorphic to a concr ete partially-ordered groupoid on a frame.
Proof. We define the canonical frame as follows. The points of the frame are cones. The following definitions of R can all be shown equivalent using residuation (cf. Dunn (1993a)):
We define α ⊑ β iff α ⊆ β. It is easy to verify the "tonicity conditions"(3.1) -(3.3).
For the representation, we define the canonical isomorphism
It is well-known (and obvious) that this is a 1-1 map carrying ≤ into ⊆. It is also known (cf. Dunn 1993) that h preserves •, and →. To make this paper self-contained we briefly recapitulate the proof here.
So we prove
For left-to-right let us suppose that a • b ∈ χ. As is standard, we define the principal filter determined by x, [x) = {y :
Again half is immediate, this time from left-to-right. We prove the other half by proving the contrapositive:
It is easy to see that this is the cone generated from χ
Further it is clear that b / ∈ β, for otherwise (residuation) for some x ∈ χ, x ≤ a → b, and so a → b ∈ χ, contrary to our assumption.
We next go about the business of accommodating identity elements.
Theorem 5.2 Every partially-ordered residuated groupoid (with left or right, possibly lower, identity elements) is isomorphic to a concr ete partially-ordered residuated groupoid with respectively left or right, possibly lower, identity elements).
Proof. We first consider a left lower identity. Canonically, we define I = {i : e ∈ i}. We show that if ∃i ∈ I, Riαβ, then α ⊆ β. Thus suppose ∃i ∈ I, Riαβ and a ∈ α. Then since e ∈ i, e • a ≤ a ∈ β.
If e is a full identity element, then a ≤ e • a. Suppose α ⊆ β, then clearly R • [e)αβ, for if e ≤ x and a ∈ α, then a ≤ e • a ≤ x • a and so x • a ∈ β.
The arguments for a right (lower) identity are symmetric.
We are now in a position to establish some embedding results, but first we need the following: Lemma 5.3 Every partially-ordered groupoid (with left or right, possibly lower, identity elements) is representable as a concrete partially-ordered groupoid (with left or right, possibly lower, identity elements).
Proof. The proof is an easy "corollary" of the proofs of the corresponding theorems regarding residuated partially ordered groupoids. Just omit consideration of the residuals.
Theorem 5.4 Every partially-ordered groupoid (with left or right, possibly lower, identity elements) is embeddable in a partially-ordered residuated groupoid (with left or right, possibly lower, identity elements).
Proof. By the lemma we know that the partially-ordered groupoid can be represented as a concrete partially-ordered groupoid on a frame (U, R, ⊑). This concrete partially-ordered groupoid is a substructure of the full concrete partially-ordered groupoid on that frame. (The idea is that once one has the relation R, one implicitly has the residual ⇒ which can be defined using R.) To accommodate say a left (possibly lower) identity element, we simply notice that in representing the partiallyordered groupoid with left identity we are given a set I ⊆ U which functions in the correct way. The same is true for a right (lower) identity element.
We now turn to representing the combinators. Not only is it possible to produce models of a combinatory poset (X, ≤, •, C), but one can give a representation theorem. We illustrate first with a λ-poset (X, ≤, •, {k, s}). The canonical frame is defined as above, except we must show how to define sets of states corresponding to the combinators. We do the same thing as we did with the left identity I, which of course is just the identity combinator. Define the canonical combinators as follows: K = {α : k ∈ α}, and S = {α : s ∈ α}. The function h(x) = {α : x ∈ α} can be verified to be an embedding.
K: We need to verify ∃k ∈ K(Rkαγχ) only if α ⊑ χ. Suppose that k ∈ K and
and so a ∈ χ as desired. If the postulate for K is given as an identity rather than as an inequality, we have to then also verify the other direction. Thus suppose α ⊑ χ. We set k = [k), and we set δ = [k • α), and show R • kαδ. Suppose k ∈ k, a ∈ α. We must show k • a ∈ [k • α). But k • a ≤ k • a and this suffices. We still have to show R • δγχ. So suppose d ∈ δ and c ∈ γ. We need to show
W: Let us verify this by assuming the left-hand side. We must show that there exists a cone • such that for any x ∈ α, y ∈ β, x • y ∈ •. We let • = {x : ∃a ∈ α, b 1 ∈ β, a • b 1 ≤ c}. Clearly Rαβ•. We still must show R • βχ. We assume c ∈ • and b 2 ∈ β, and show c • b 2 ∈ χ. Since c ∈ •, then ∃a ∈ α, b 1 ∈ β, a • b 1 ≤ c. A problem is caused by the fact that we are not working with a single b ∈ β, but rather two: β 1 , β 2 . But since each cone is lower-directed, ∃b ∈ β(b ≤ b 1 , b 2 ). Since the left-hand side says Rwαβχ, we have (
If the postulate for W is given as an identity, the other direction must be verified. We leave this to the reader.
We also leave to the reader the verification that various standard combinators (e.g., b, c) impose their corresponding conditions on the associated canonical frame. It seems pretty clear after such exercises, that this extends to arbitrary combinator elements, but we do not formally prove it.
Structurally free logic
There is the well-known "Curry-Howard Isomorphism" that establishes a connection between combinators and provable implicational formulas. This translation of the λI-calculus uses the combinators I, B, C, and S (cf. Barendregt (1981) ), and these are well-known to correspond to the implicational axioms of the relevance logic R by way of the Curry-Howard Isomorphism (cf. Anderson, Belnap, and Dunn (1992) ). An equivalent set of combinators is I, B, C, and W. It cannot be a mere accident that Church was the creator of both the λI-calculus and the Weak Calculus of Implication (the implicational fragment of which agrees with the relevance logic R).
It is easy, given the combinatory identities above, and residuation, to derive an "object language" version of the Curry-Howard Isomorphism. Thus, e.g., from (3.17) using residuation we can derive:
And from (3.18) and residuation we can derive
The situation with S is a little less transparent, but the reader can readily establish, using first (3.21) and then residuation (and isotonicty):
From this by repeated residuation we can obtain:
(6.4)
The observations above lead naturally to the idea of a "universal" substructural logic, in which there are no structural rules; every manipulation corresponding to a structural rule is instead licensed by an explicit combinator. We might call this a "structurally free" logic, in analogy with so-called "free logic" (logic freed from existential presuppositions). In ordinary free logic existential presuppositions are made explicit by introducing a predicate for existence. Similarly in structurally free logic, structural rules are made explicit by introducting combinators. Putting things in a paradoxical tone, we might say that structurally free logic is "combinatorially free," but it is not "combinator free." The combinators are in effect issued as licenses that must be displayed on the windshield of an inference.
16
This idea was already in Meyer (1976) , wherein was presented a Gentzen system with no structural rules, but each structural manipulation being viewed as an explicit rule for introducing a combinator as a premiss.
Thus let us consider the combinator babc = a(bc). It is easy to see that
We believe this to be in the spirit of "illative" combinatory logic, propounded by Curry and Feys (1972) .
Proof.
6, exportation
Constants and exponentials
We have in effect used combinators in place of structural rules. Thus a theorem of a substructural logic corresponds to the derivation of an inequality of the form
with parentheses put in ad lib. c 1 · · · c n might best be regarded as a binary tree with combinators at its tips, but for concreteness we will think of it as a string, with the binary structuring indicated by parentheses.
The actual string and its structuring will differ depending upon the theorem proven. But the combinators allowed in the string will be fixed for a given logic. Thus, e.g., to cite the most well-known example, for intuitionistic logic each c i will be either s or k. Thus e.g., we will have skk ≤ a → a as the following proof shows.
• For relevance logic, each c i will be one of b, c, w or i.
• For BCK logic, each c i will be one of b, c, k, or i.
• For linear logic, each c i will be one of b, c,or i.
• For Lambek calculus with empty left side, each c i will be one of b or i.
• For non-associative Lambek calculus with empty left side, each c i will be i.
Note for this last, if we take i to be a full identity, we can have just one occurrence of i. The question arises as to when one can reduce a string of combinators to a single constant. A sufficient answer is that we can do so if permutation, associativity, contraction are part of the logic. These allow one to group all occurrences of a given combinator together and then replace them by a single occurrence. The system of relevant implication has all of these structural rules, and so differs from intuitionistic implication only in lacking the structural rule of thinning. If we add k, then we can translate intuitionistic logic into relevance logic so extended, and a theorem a of intuitionistic logic is anything of the form k, . . . , k ≤ a. So all we have on the left is a string of occurrences of k, and because of contraction this can be taken to be a single occurrence of k. For relevance logic itself, since b, c, w are all represented by structural rules, it is only i that is left, and because of contraction a string of i's can be replaced with a single i, which in the relevance logic literature has in effect been symbolized as t. This explains why Meyer (1973) can translate intuitionistic implication a ⊃ b into relevance logic by the translation (a ∧ t) → b. Girard (1987) does the translation into linear logic by the translation !a ( b, using his operator "of course." Girard calls this operator ! an "exponential," and it cannot be defined using a single constant. But !a can be thought of as any string one wants of k and w. It can be taken as a string because linear logic has associativity. Further, because of commutation we can arrange things so that say all of the occurrences of k come first, and then all the occurrences of w. This suggests that various substructural logics can be translated into each other by introducing various exponentials as dummies for corresponding classes of strings of combinators.
Both residuals: dual combinators
It is possible to have both residuals. Lambek calculus does. In the usual CurryHoward isomorphism, or in the filter models, there is only one residual. Where does the other residual enter in? Let us consider an element b −1 ∈ X (not to be confused with b ′ ), 17 subject to the axiom:
This is in some sense the "dual" of b. In an alternative "right-handed" world, combinators would be regarded as acting from the right, and we would also have the convention of associating parentheses to the right, and this axiom would be the mirror image of the b axiom. It is easy to see (cf. Dunn (1993a)) that one can prove:
Dual combinators are needed if one wants to license properties of the dual residual ← as in the associative Lambek Calculus. One can think of the "dual combinators" (and the dual residual) as just an alternative notation, and this is no more exciting that the difference between Polish (prefix) and reverse Polish notation (suffix) notation, which (HP's marketing not withstanding) is a trivial difference. But an exciting alternative does present itself. What if we allow the combinators and dual combinators to live in the same system? Once we interpret x • y as applying x (thought of as a function) to y (thought of as an argument), we are no longer free to interpret x • y in "RPN" as applying y to x. If we think of y as doing something to x, it is not what a function does to an argument, but rather the dual: what an argument does to a function. From a computer perspective, one might think of applying a program to some data and ending up with a modified program. Dual combinators are special kinds of arguments, special kinds of data, 17 And also not to be confused with the notion of an inverse combinator in Curry and Feys (1972) , for which they use the notation −1 as well.
that modify functions in certain kinds of ways. Thus the dual combinator b −1 above rearranges the order of application:
We should note that in the last stages of writing this paper we learned from M. Dezani that similar ideas about arguments affecting functions have been recently investigated by F. Barbanera and S. Berardi (1996) under the heading "symmetric lambda calculus." We have not yet had an opportunity to study their paper, but we are told by Dezani, and by e-mail from Berardi, that the Church-Rosser Theorem fails for the symmetric lambda calculus. This gives some reason to think that the same should then be true for combinatory logic extended with duals of combinators, but we shall not pursue this here.
Extensionality
Extensionality 18 requires:
Clearly our models are not extensional, since what can be done by one set of actions can also be accomplished by another (take the same actions but partition them in different ways). Indeed, the same thing can always be accomplished by the single action which is the union of the set of actions:
This not only shows that extensionality fails; it also suggests a way to obtain extensionality by working with the union of a set of actions rather than with the set. This also lowers things a type level, since such a union is itself an action (and not a set of actions). For this reason we shall denote A also as A ↓ . But there are some technical aspects that get in the way of this type-lowered representation. We need to know that this map preserves relevant notions. In particular we must show:
This last should be spelled out as: 5) and when this is done it is evident that the right-hand side has no sense. Both A ↓ and X ↓ are relations, and we have given no sense to what their "product" might be.
Relative product is about the only thing that comes to mind, but it is associative, whereas application is not. We shall return to the issue of extensionality, but we first consider "extensionality" in another sense: whether two states are identical if (and of course only if) they determine the same set of ordered pairs.
In the Routley-Meyer semantics there is a favored point 0. They define α ⊑ β iff R0αβ, and show from various postulates that ⊑ has the properties of a pre-order (reflexive, transitivity). In the representation of relation algebras we were not able to utilize a single such favored point, but instead introduced a set I of them together with an explicit partial order ⊑, and the requirement that the frame be assertional, which amounts to just ∃i ∈ I(Riαβ) iff α ⊑ β iff ∃i ∈ I(Rαiβ).
(9.6)
How are we to think of the set I? Let us break down (9.6) into two parts:
The meaning of (9.7) is reasonably clear: each R i is just a part of the information order, and in fact the information order can be reconstructed by piecing together all of the R i 's: ⊑ is just i∈I R i . But how are we to interpret (9.8)? In honesty its sense is less than straightforward. 19 But let us try to think of it as follows. Let us suppose that we could add some new points i ′ as "information order indicators." The job of the points i ′ is to tell us when two states α and β stand in the information order. We might then postulate (9.8) as above.
We can now show:
Theorem 9.1 (Extensionality) On the assumption of (9.8), two relation correlates are identical just when they determine the same sets of ordered pairs, i.e.,
Proof. Left-to-right is just logic (substitution of identicals). For right-to-left we assume R ρ = R σ , i.e., ∀α, β(Rραβ iff Rσαβ). Now for some i ′ ∈ I −1 , Rρi ′ ρ holds since ρ = ρ. Instantiating (9.8), we obtain Rρi ′ ρ iff Rσi ′ ρ. Hence Rσi ′ ρ. But then by (9.8) we obtain σ ⊑ ρ. A symmetric argument (again using (9.8)) shows ρ ⊑ σ.
Let us return to the discussion of extensionality (9.9) for combinators. Note that on the assumption (9.8), then I −1 is a right identity:
This means that if ∀X(AX = BX), then in particular AI −1 = BI −1 , and hence by (9.10) A = B.
We report an odd fact.
Fact 9.2 On the assumption that i −1 is a full right identity, then there is an alternative "lower level" representation:ȟ(a) = {(x, y) : a • x ≤ y}.
Proof. The "states" of the canonical frame are now not cones (or filters, etc.), which are sets of elements, but rather the elements themselves. On the assumption that i This means that we can actually represent an element as a relation. BUT, this depends on the existence of a dual combinator i −1 which satisfies two way reducibility so as to be a full right identity. In relation algebras (cf. Dunn (1995) ), where • is understood as relative product, there is a natural relation which is both a full left and right identity, namely the relation of identity (restricted to the given domain of states). Given our interpretation here of • as a kind of image operator, there is of course a set of states I determining the identity relation, and this serves as a left identity. But it seems less intuitive to think that there should be a set of states I −1 which should be such that no matter what state-determined action is applied to them, the same set of states that determines the action should result. And of course if we make I −1 a full right identity, there seems no reason not to make I a full left identity. But then, as we have seen, I = I −1 , which seems at least a bit mysterious. Even if we assume that i (or some other element) is both a left and right lower identity, we still do not get a full representation in all contexts. If we have only a combinatory poset, we are OK. We can even have meet. But if we have a distributive lattice ordering,ȟ fails to preserve join.
Defining combinators on frames
Heretofore we have treated combinators on frames as distinguished subsets of states subjected to appropriate postulates. But here we briefly explore the alternative of defining them rather than postulating them.
Let us write ∀A(A → A) to mean {A → A : A ∈ P(U ) ↑ }, and alternatively abbreviate this as I df . Clearly I df ⊆ A → A. It follows from residuation that I df •A ⊆ A. Since the intersection of hereditary subsets is itself hereditary, this suggests that we define the identity combinator on the frame simply as I df .
We can similarly define
). Note that if the combinator I is already present, we can obtain I ⊆ I df as follows:
1. IA ⊆ A I reduction 2. I ⊆ A → A 1, residuation 3. I ⊆ ∀A(A → A) since 2 holds for arbitrary A.
Similarly we obtain:
It does not seem possible to prove that these are identities.
Adding conjunction and disjunction
It is a small addition to add conjunction as the greatest lower bound of two elements:
The representation is just as before except that we have to replace cones with filters, a filter F being a cone that additionally satisfies the condition:
(11.
3)
The reason this works is that it is easy to see that the converse of (11.3) also holds, so that we have:
This means that h(a) = {F : a ∈ F } carries ∧ to ∩. Clearly h still carries ≤ into ⊆ , and is also easy to see that h is still one-one, since the principal cone determined by a, [a), is also a filter. Things get much more complicated if we try to add ∨ (least upper bound) as well, subjecting it of course to the conditions:
There is first the question as to whether to further require the distributive law:
Actually things are much more easy in one sense if we do, and in another sense if we do not. The sense in which things are less easy is that we will have to use Zorn's Lemma, but otherwise the adaptation is straightforward. We first have to replace filters with prime filters, a prime filter P being a filter that additionally satisfies:
It is easy to see that the converse of (11.8) holds for any filter. This ensures that h(a) = {P : a ∈ P } carries ∨ into ∪.
What is not so easy now is that h is one-one. For this we need that if a b, then ∃P (a ∈ P and b / ∈ P ). This is where Zorn's Lemma comes in (cf. Stone (1937) ). Zorn's Lemma is also sometimes needed to show that the canonical frame has properties associated with certain combinators (e.g., B).
If we do not have distribution, the nature of the underlying representation becomes more complicated. Allwein and Dunn (1993) use Urquhart's general representation of lattices, extending it to accommodate additional operators from linear logic. There seems no reason why the techniques used there cannot be applied to a lattice with combinator elements, but the details are complicated.
12 Gentzen systems Meyer (1976) contains a Gentzen system that is in effect the syntactic precursor of the combinatory posets that we have presented above. 20 We here present a modification which we shall call LC, and which is even closer to our notion of a combinatory poset. We shall then comment on the differences between this and Meyer's earlier system.
We assume a denumerable stock p, q, r, . . . of atomic sentences together with some additional symbols C 1 , . . . , C i , . . . which we call combinators. We give an inductive definition of sentence:
1. if ϕ is an atomic sentence or combinator, then ϕ is a sentence; 2. if ϕ and ψ are sentences, then so are (ϕ • ψ) and (ϕ → ψ). 21 We can now give the following inductive definition of structure.
1. if ϕ is a sentence, then ϕ is a structure; 2. if Γ and ∆ are structures, then so is the ordered pair Γ, ∆ .
A sequent is anything of the form Γ ⊢ ϕ where Γ is a structure and ϕ is a sentence. We shall call Γ the antecedent of the sequent, and ϕ its succedent.
We use capital Greek letters to denote structures, and lower case Greek letters to denote sentences. Note that the "combinatory rules" below involve structures. This is so as to be able to prove Lemma 12.3.
We first introduce the operational rules:
We next add the combinatory rules, starting with some examples:
20 RKM got the idea of the general Gentzen system while working on the Anderson-Belnap "P-W Problem." He wishes to note that the idea of making the combinators explicit came from Belnap. 21 Note that there is no reason not to have ← and dual combinators. We leave it to the reader to keep track that these additions would in no way affect the proof of the "Cut-elimination Theorem" below. 22 We use an informal substitution notation. E.g. in the rule (• ⊢), the premiss is written so as to exhibit the pair (ϕ, ψ) and the conclusion has this replaced with the sentence (ϕ • ψ). We assume association to the left, so that, e.g., in the rule (C ⊢), the premiss contains ((Θ, Φ), Ψ) and the conclusion has this replaced by ((C, Θ), Ψ), Φ).
Remark 12.1 From these rules one can derive various combinatory reductions, e.g.:
Also we point out that in (C ⊢) and (W ⊢) one can get the effect of Θ being void by letting it be I. This assumes of course that the system has the combinator I. In its absence one might wish to add rules corresponding to the combinators C * xy B yx and
To state what a general combinatory rule is we need to introduce some notions. By Σ(Ψ 1 , . . . , Ψ n ) we mean the class of structures which can be constructed from any non-empty subset of {Ψ 1 , . . . , Ψ n } (allowing repetitions). This can be defined inductively:
We shall use σ(Ψ 1 , . . . , Ψ n ) as a variable ranging over Σ(Ψ 1 , . . . , Ψ n ). Let C be some given combinator of our language. The single rule governing C will be of the following form:
Generally σ rearranges the Ψ 1 , . . . , Ψ n (consider C or B), but sometimes it duplicates (consider S), and sometimes it deletes (consider K). And sometimes it just leaves them alone (consider I). It is clear that there are denumerable many combinatory rules, and we shall assume that they are associated uniquely with the combinators C 1 , . . . , C i , . . . .
Remark 12.2
It may sometimes be convenient to work with a Gentzen system which does not have all of the primitive combinators C 1 , . . . , C i , . . . . Thus for example one might want a Gentzen system that corresponds to relevant implication and has only the combinators B, C, W, I. Where C is any set of combinators, by LC(C ) is meant the system that has the operational rules and just the combinatory rules for the combinators in C. LC(∅) a Gentzen system for the non-associative Lambek calculus restricted to a single arrow, which is the same as a non-associative version of the relevance logic B.
Lemma 12.3 (Combinatory Substitution) Each rule (C ⊢) is closed under substitution in the antecedent, i.e., for any sentence ϕ = C,the following is also an instance of C:
(12.14)
Proof. Using a prime to indicate the substitution so as to simplify notation, and distributing the substitution across the several parts of the antecedent, this can be rewritten so as to make clear this is an instance of C:
Certain sequents are especially important from a logical point of view. A sequent Γ ⊢ ϕ will be called purely logical when no combinator occurs in ϕ, and Γ consists only of combinators. Thus ϕ is an ordinary logical sentence, made up from atomic sentences using the connectives → and •, while Γ is a string of combinators, with parentheses placed ad lib, providing witnesses as to which combinatory rules could be used to derive Γ ⊢ ϕ. Of course a sequent which is purely logical can be derived from a sequent which is not, by applying (⊢→). It thus makes sense to relax the notion, and a sequent Γ ⊢ ϕ will be called simply logical when no combinator occurs in ϕ, and Γ consists only of combinators and combinator-free formulas.
Looking at the conclusion of a rule, for both of the operational rules we shall call the newly introduced formula occurrence the principal constituent. For the combinatory rules we shall call the newly introduced combinator occurrence principal. The other formula occurrences in the conclusion are parametric constituents.
For the Gentzen structural rule Thinning, Curry calls the newly thinned in formula occurrence "principal" (and similarly for Contraction, counting as "principal" the occurrence of the formula that has just be contracted from two occurrences to one). If we were to follow him in this and extend the idea to the rule (K ⊢) (which for us substitutes for Thinning), it would introduce two principal constituents. And generalizations of (K ⊢) (see K 2 ) would introduce even more than two principal constituents). Our terminology keeps to Curry's fundamental idea that each rule should introduce only one principal constituent. This idea of Curry's was already challenged by Permutation (where arguably both permuted occurrences have been newly introduced), but Curry chose to treat these as in effect merely rearranged. We extend this insight to all of the formulas "rearranged" by the combinatory rules. This includes (W ⊢).
The essential difference between the Gentzen system above and that of Meyer (1976) is that it treats combinators as first-class objects. Meyer (1976) restricted the reflexitivity axiom to propositional variables:
so one could not have, say:
A trivial difference, hardly worth mentioning, is that Meyer (1976) had no rules for •. The effect of • in antecedents was to just replace our commas, but there was no rule that introduced • in succedents. The bottom line was that combinators and • could occur only in antecedents. We are also making good on the claim of Meyer (1976) that "We may vary the general Gentzen system by making a different choice of combinators." We have done this by providing a general characterization of a combinatory rule and we will now show that a general "cut elimination theorem" can be proven using this notion.
The astute reader will notice that transitivity is absent from our list of rules. This is because the following more general form can be proved to be an "admissible rule" (admissible means that adding it will not give any more derivable sequents):
In proving this by induction we will find that we need to establish a somewhat more general form. By ∆[ϕ] we have been meaning a structure with a particular occurrence of the formula ϕ identified, and then by ∆[Γ] we mean the result of replacing that particular occurrence of ϕ by the structure Γ. By the round-bracket notation ∆(ϕ) we will mean a structure with at least one and perhaps many occurrences (but not necessarily all) of the formula ϕ identified, and then by ∆(Γ) we mean the result of replacing those identified occurrences of ϕ by the structure Γ.
Theorem 12.4 (Cut-elimination)
The following is admissible in LC:
Let D be a derivation with but one application of Multiple Cut, and that at the very end. Then there is an equivalent derivation D ′ with no application of Multiple Cut.
Proof. We prove the theorem by a double induction, the outermost induction being on the degree (number of occurrences of connectives) of the cut formula ϕ and the innermost induction being on the rank of the given derivation, where the rank of the derivation is obtained as the sum of "left rank" and the "right rank." The left rank is straightforward to define. It is the longest length of an uninterrupted thread in the proof tree, starting from the left premiss, which contains the formula ϕ as a succedent. The notion of the right rank is much less straightforward to define. The intuitive idea is that one starts from the right premiss and finds the longest length of an uninterrupted thread that contains "ancestral occurrences" of an eliminated occurrence of the formula ϕ. The notion of an ancestral occurrence comes from Curry and is more than a little messy to define. But the idea is to start with an identified occurrence of ϕ and see how one can trace it back from earlier occurrences of ϕ. With the rules that introduce connectives this amounts to seeing whether ϕ was passive in the application of a rule. This is complicated a bit by combinators such as K that delete an occurrence of ϕ. The way to view this (looking up the tree) is that an occurrence of ϕ has split amoeba-like into several occurrences, and one can trace the occurrences in all of their several incarnations. So the induction proceeds by supposing the theorem true for derivations of degree < n, and proving it true for derivations of degree n, but i) showing it is true for derivations of degree n and rank k = 2, and ii) showing that it is true for derivations of degree n and rank k (k > 2), provided it is true for derivations of degree n and rank < k.
Case 1. k = 2. 1.1 Left or right premiss an axiom. The conclusion is the same as the other premiss. 1.2 Right premiss by a combinatory rule.
There are two subcases, depending on whether ϕ is the combinator C or not. 1.2.1 ϕ = C. Since we have no rules for introducing combinators in the succedent and since ϕ was just introduced into the succedent of the left premiss, we know that Γ ⊢ ϕ must in fact be the axiom C ⊢ C. This reduces to case 1.1.
1.2.1 ϕ = C. The idea here is to apply the cut higher up (reducing rank):
Note that the fact that ϕ just came in allows us to rewrite the conclusion so that all of the replacements occur in one or more Ψ i . Lemma (12. 3) guarantees that the rule (C ⊢) can still be applied after the cut as illustrated above.
As an example consider the combinator K:
This is rewritten as:
(12.23)
Left premiss by (⊢ →).
We can assume we have 24) since the only other way that ϕ 1 → ϕ 2 could be introduced as new in the antecedent of the right premiss is if it came by a combinatory rule for a deleting combinator such as K. This case (1.2) has already been argued. The following transform is justified by a reduction of degree:
(12.25)
Left premiss by (⊢ •).
Again we may assume that the right premiss comes by (• ⊢). So we are given:
Again the following transform is justified by reduction of degree: 
We push the cut up (reducing rank) and then apply the combinatory rule (note the thick line denotes possibly many applications as needed):
2.1.2. Left premiss by (→ ⊢). We are given:
Transform: 
Note that ∆ ′′ ⊢ χ is missing for a 1-premiss rule. The general idea of the transforms in this case is to replace any ancestral occurrences of ϕ in ∆ ′ ⊢ χ, ∆ ′′ ⊢ χ, and then apply cut to these premisses (justified by a reduction of rank). We then apply the rule that led to ∆ ⊢ χ. If there is still an instance of ϕ in the antecedent ∆ this means it was just introduced. In that instance we can again apply cut justified by the fact that rank = 2.
Let us consider the case where the right premiss comes by a combinatory rule:
Let us first consider the case where the principal constituent is not eliminated. We transform this as follows:
In the case where the principal constituent is eliminated we are not yet finished. In particular if the newly introduced occurrence of C is eliminated we must add one more step of cut as follows:
Remark 12.5 Corresponding to every combinatory rule there is also a "structural" rule. These are familiar in the cases of C, K, W, corresponding as we know to Permutation, Thinning, and Contraction. It seems clear that the proof of cut elimination given above can be straightforwardly adapted to accommodate all of these structural rules. This greatly expands the number of so-called "substructural logics."
Remark 12.6 Now that we have proven the Cut-elimination Theorem (12.4), we can form the "Lindenbaum algebra" of a Gentzen system LC(C ) and get a left-residuated combinatory poset. The Lindenbaum algebra is formed by in effect identifying two equivalent formulas. More formally, we set [ϕ] = {ψ : ϕ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ ϕ are derivable}.We define a p.o. on equivalence classes:
4) tells us ≤ is transitive). We then define operations on the equivalence classes:
It is then possible using our representation to get a completeness result for the Gentzen system relative to ternary frames.
The subformula property and decidability
Since Gentzen systems have figured importantly in showing various logical systems to be decidable, it is obligatory that we discuss the decidability of LC and its various subsystems. Given that in general the question of reducibility in combinatory logic is undecidable we cannot be too optimistic, and we regrettably end up raising more questions that we answer.
It is clear that LC has what is commonly known as:
The Subformula Property: Every formula that occurs in a premiss also occurs in the conclusion, though perhaps as a subformula. This is sometimes expressed as "nothing gets lost." In Gentzen systems with Contraction, e.g. those for intuitionistic implication and relevant implication, this is not strictly true. A formula can occur twice in a premiss, yet occur only once in a conclusion, and so at least an occurrence gets lost. This makes decidability complicated, since one can wonder whether a given formula occurrence comes by contraction, duplicate it to see, and end up wondering again if one or both of the duplicated occurrences comes by contraction. Gentzen systems such as those for linear implication and the Lambek calculus, which lack contraction, have what we might call:
The Linear Subformula Property: Every formula occurrence in a premiss has a descendent occurrence in the conclusion, though perhaps as a subformula, and these can be matched in a one-one manner.
Decidability is easy for systems such these. It is well-known that the Lambek calculus is decidable, and this includes the decidability of LC(∅) as a special case. The proof is pretty obvious. In trying to prove a sequent of the form Γ ⊢ ϕ, one has only the formulas in Γ and ϕ that can be the principal constituent as a result of applying an operational rule. If one points to a formula ψ as the principal constituent, it depends on the main connective of ψ (either → or •) as to which rule has been applied, and one can reconstruct the premisses (though in the case of (→⊢) and (⊢ •) there will be finitely many choices about how to divide up the parametric formulas). Since there are only finitely many formulas at "top level," there are only finitely many potential premisses that one can write above Γ ⊢ ϕ. One can go on in this way constructing a "proof search tree" which has only finite forking at each node. Because of the Linear Subformula Property, each branch is finite. König's Lemma says that a tree is finite if it has finite forking and each branch is finite. So the completed proof search tree is finite, and will contain a proof if one exists. It is clearly a mechanical procedure to determine whether or not it contains a proof. This proof can be easily extended to accommodate additional structural rules such as permutation or thinning, which only add finitely many additional premisses to consider at each stage.
One might think that adding explicit combinators in place of structural rules, while it does not give the Linear Subformula Property, gives something close enough to assure decidability. Let us consider Contraction in its combinatory form:
Although one occurrence of Φ disappears, W * provides a record of its disappearance. It is easy to be fooled into thinking that there is no real difference between keeping the second copy of Φ and having W * in its place. This is somewhat like the system they had in the Old Bodleian Library of leaving a slip behind when one took a copy of a book from the shelf. But setting Φ to be W * , W * shows the disanalogy:
2)
The Bodleian system would have to be modified so that one could leave a slip in place of a slip, indeed a slip that itself was serving in the role of two slips. The vision of decidability becomes clouded. There may be some way of limiting the role of (W * ⊢), much as the role of the rule of contraction has been limited by Kripke in his proof of the decidability of the implicational fragment of relevance logic (cf. Anderson and Belnap (1975) -this can easily be extended to accommodate fusion as well).
One might then think there is hope here for a general decision procedure for logical sequents. But that hope is dashed once one considers a combinator W 2 , which is a more powerful version of W * that makes two copies at a time: And we are off and running to create an infinite branch. It seems worth pointing out that even if we were successful in finding a decision procedure for the logical sequents of LC, or some particular subsystem LC(C ), this would not by itself establish that the associated propositional logic is decidable. The problem is that the provability of ϕ in the logic requires the provability of some sequent of the form σ(C 1 . . . , C n ) ⊢ ϕ, and it is far from clear that there is a method to focus in on some particular sequent of that form (or some finite set of such sequents).
14 Adding ∧ and ∨ to the Gentzen system
We can add the following rules.
Cut is still provable, but the following is not derivable from these rules:
ϕ ∧ (ψ ∨ χ) ⊢ (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ χ) (Distribution) (14.5) Algebraically, these rules amount to adding lattice operations to a combinatory poset, together with the distribution law:
The question now arises as to whether we should have distribution or not. As is usual in life, we have trade-offs. From a proof-theoretic point of view the easiest, and probably most natural decision, is not to have distribution. This is the path taken by Girard (1987) for linear logic. If we do want distribution, as in orthodox relevance logic, it would appear that we have to go to considerable trouble to get a Gentzen system. §28.5 of Anderson and Belnap (1975) describes a Gentzen system (developed independently by Dunn and Mints), wherein are provided two different kinds of "commas," interpreted as extensional and intensional conjunction (fusion). On the other hand, from a semantical point of view the easiest and again the most natural decision is to have distribution. As we saw above, this allows us to build on the representation Stone gave of distributive lattices as collections of sets closed under intersection and union. If we give up distribution we have to use a more complicated representation such as that of Urquhart. This is the path of Allwein and Dunn (1993) . The situation is summarized in the following table. We should make clear that the two cells marked as "Hard" have not been fully explored. We think we have identified workable strategies, but have not worked through the details.
Distribution
No distribution 
